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European Political Cooperation After the Single 
European Act: The Future of Foreign Affairs in 
the European Communities 
by Daniel T. MU1phy* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Single European Act (SEA)' consists of two ostensibly unrelated sets of 
provisions, both of which are intended to contribute to unification among 
members of the European Communities. 2 Perhaps the major, and most widely 
publicized, provisions of the SEA consist of amendments to the Treaty of Rome 
(EEC Treaty).3 The remaining provisions of the SEA, predominately title III, 
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Law School, University of Richmond, Virginia. 
'Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986,29 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1987) [hereinafter SEA]. 
The SEA entered into force July 1, 1987 after the last instrument of ratification, that of the Republic 
of Ireland, was deposited. 29 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 29 (1987). For a brief analysis of the SEA, 
see Glaesner, The Single European Act: Attempt at Appraisal, 10 FORD. INT'L. L.J. 446 (1987); Lonbay, The 
Single European Act, 11 B.C. INT'L COMPo L. REV. 31 (1988). 
2 There is no doubt that unification is one of the purposes of the SEA. In the preamble the member 
states note that in adopting the SEA they are: 
[m]oved by the will to continue the work undertaken on the basis of the Treaties establishing 
the European Communities and to transform relations as a whole among their States into a European 
Union, in accordance with the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart of 19 June 1983 .... 
SEA, supra note 1, at 2 (emphasis added). 
The SEA has been criticized as a step backwards in the process of European unification. See 
Resolution, 29 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 36) 144 (1986); Glaesner, supra note 1, at n.2; Pescatore, Some 
Critical Remarks on the Single European Act, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 9 (1987). 
3 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,298 U.N.T.S. 11 [here-
inafter EEC Treaty]. 
The amendments to the EEC Treaty are the more widely publicized portion of the SEA. The most 
important of these amendments is the provision setting December 31, 1992 as the deadline for the 
completion of the internal market within the Community. In this market, all internal or national 
barriers to the four Community-established freedoms-the free movement of goods, persons, services, 
and capital-are eliminated. SEA, supra note 1, at title I, subsection II, arts. 13-15. 
The SEA also alters the voting procedures of the Council of the European Communities (Council) 
for certain regulations and directives, especially those necessary for the realization of the internal 
market. See Glaesner, supra note 1, at 459-61. One effect of these reforms is to further weaken the 
impact of the Luxembourg Accords. The Luxembourg Accords were an understanding of the member 
states to agree that certain matters would not be put to a vote unless they enjoyed the unanimous 
support of the members. See infra note 92 and accompanying text. This agreement is affected by a 
provision allowing the adoption of certain additional regulations and directives by a qualified majority 
of the member states in the Council. SEA, supra note 1, at title II, art. 16 (amending articles 57(2), 59, 
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formalize the system of European Political Cooperation (EPC) within the mem-
ber states.4 
Although not widely written about, or perhaps appreciated in this country, 
EPC has become an efficient system for coordinating foreign affairs positions 
within the European Economic Community (EEC).5 The EEC Treaty, as one of 
its aims, fosters a closer political union among its member states.6 The frame-
work of the EEC, however, does not fully provide the means for establishing a 
political union. EPC was designed as an extra-treaty mechanism to facilitate 
union in foreign affairs. Toward that end, the Community and its member 
states have informally evolved EPC procedures over the last fifteen years. 7 
In title III of the SEA, the member states have established a new system for 
cooperation in foreign affairs. Although title III is not the dominant portion 
of the SEA, the changes it makes in the EPC process are extremely significant. 
Title III and the process it creates represent a continuation of the uniquely 
70(1), and 84 of the EEC Treaty). Previously, these measures could be adopted only by the unanimous 
vote of the Council. See generally D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES 197-210 (4th ed. 1987). 
The SEA also significantly enhances the role of the Parliament of the European Communities 
(Parliament) in the Community's legislative process. See SEA, supra note I, at title II, art. 7 (amending 
article 149 of the EEC Treaty). Parliament now is afforded a role of cooperation in the adoption of 
measures by the Council. The new procedures provide for cooperation from the Parliament in the 
adoption of regulations and directives. Under these procedures, the Council will act by a qualified 
majority on a proposal for a regulation or directive submitted to it by the Commission of the European 
Communities (Commission) after receiving the opinion of the Parliament on the matter. Thereafter, 
the action of the Council, together with a full explanation of the reasons for its action, are commu-
nicated to the Parliament. If the measure, as approved by the Council, is adopted by Parliament, or 
Parliament takes no action on it, then it becomes effective. If Parliament rejects the measure, however, 
the regulation or directive can become effective only if it is reapproved by the unanimous vote of the 
Council. Id. See also D. LASOK &J. BRIDGE, supra, 197-210; Glaesner, supra note I, at 464-68; Edward, 
The Impact of the Single Act on the Institutions, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 19, 24-27 (1987); Bieber, 
Pantalis & Schoo, Implications of the Single Act for the European Parliament, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 
767 (1986). 
In addition, the SEA adds several new substantive areas to the EEC Treaty. For example, as amended, 
the EEC Treaty now contains provisions dealing with the convergence of the member states' economic 
and monetary policies, improvement of the working environment, encouragemerit of cooperation in 
research and technology areas with the aim of strengthening the basis of European industry, and 
action by the Community on environmental matters. SEA, supra note 1, at title II, arts. 20, 21, 24, 25. 
4 SEA, supra note I, at title III, art. 30. 
5 See generally D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 3, at 210-15; P. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY LAW 253-55 (4th ed. 1985); Murphy, The System of European Political Cooperation: A Brief 
Explanation, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 383 (1985); Stein, Towards a European Foreign Policy? The 
European Foreign Affairs System from the Perspective of the United States Constitution 60-78, in 1 INTEGRATION 
THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERIGAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE, BOOK 3 (M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe 
& J. Weiler eds. 1986) [hereinafter Stein); Von der Gablentz, Luxembourg Revisited or the Importance of 
European Political Cooperation, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 685 (1979). 
6 In the preamble to the EEC Treaty, the signatories state that they are "[dJetermined to establish 
the foundations of an even closer union among the European peoples." EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at 
15. 
7 See infra notes 8-25 and accompanying text. 
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ambivalent modus by which the member states have reached agreements in 
foreign affairs in the past. Further, title III greatly enhances the status of EPC 
in contributing toward European unification since its structure and process are 
elevated to a series of treaty commitments. This change attests to the regard 
that member states hold EPC and presumably to the role they intend it to play 
in the future. 
The purpose of this Article is to examine the pressures which led to the 
change in EPC and to consider how this system will function in the future. This 
Article begins with a discussion of EPC before the SEA and then reviews the 
origins of title III and the SEA. Next, the Article analyzes the process of EPC 
after the SEA. Finally, this Article considers the impact of the SEA on EPC in 
the future. 
II. EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION BEFORE THE SEA 
The structure and process of EPC, as they previously existed, were a set of 
working relationships which evolved from declarations and communiques issued 
following several meetings of member state leaders over the last two decades. 
The most important of these documents is the Luxembourg ReportS issued in 
1970 by the foreign ministers of the member states in response to the Hague 
Communique.9 The Copenhagen Report,1O issued in 1973, and the Paris Com-
munique of the Heads of State and Government,11 issued in 1974 at the con-
clusion of the Paris Summit, also discussed EPC. More recently, portions of the 
London Report l2 and the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart l3 have dealt with 
EPC. The London Report reaffirms the earlier documents and refined EPC 
procedures. The Solemn Declaration emphasizes the importance of coordina-
tion in foreign policy as a means of facilitating European union. 
8 Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problems of Political Unification, 3 BULL. EUR. 
COMM. (No. II) 9 (1970) [hereinafter Luxembourg Report). 
9 Final Communique of the Conference of Heads of State or Govemment on 1 and 2 December 1969 at The 
Hague, reprinted in, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THIRD GENERAL REPORT ON THE 
ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1969, at 486 (1970). In this communique, the heads of 
state and government acknowledged that great progress had been made in the development of 
Community institutions and law. They instructed their foreign ministers to "study the best way of 
achieving progress in the matter of political unification within the context of [an enlarged Commu-
nity)." 1d. at 489. 
10 Political Cooperation Between the Nine, 6 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No.9) 12 (1973) [hereinafter Copenhagen 
Report]; see also COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SEVENTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE 
ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1973, at 502 (1974). 
II Meeting of the Heads of Govemment, 7 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 12) 6 (1974) [hereinafter Paris 
Communiqul]; see also COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EIGHTH GENERAL REpORT ON THE 
ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1974, at 297 (1975). 
12 Report on European Political Cooperation, 14 BULL. EUR. COMM. (Supp. 3) 14 (1981). 
13 Solemn Declaration on European Union, 16 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No.6) 24 (1983) [hereinafter Solemn 
Declaration]. 
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As suggested in these documents, EPC consists of periodic meetings by gov-
ernment leaders, or their representatives, from the member states with the aim 
of establishing common positions on issues of foreign policy.I4 A permanent 
committee, the Political Committee, and specialized working groups assist the 
government ministers in their work. In addition, civil servants of the member 
states' foreign ministries have ongoing discussions regarding both preparation 
for the meetings and implementation of decisions. This ongoing dialogue is 
perhaps as important as the ministerial meetings. The aim of these meetings 
and procedures is to enable the member states to coordinate their positions on 
foreign policy matters. These EPC procedures have resulted in institutional 
positions by the Community on matters of foreign affairs and have contributed 
to a sense of a common European policy.I5 
EPC is not an activity of the Community per se. There are no provisions 
regarding EPC in the EEC Treaty, and the specific responsibilities of the EEC's 
institutions, as stated in the constitutive documents, make no reference to it. 
Nevertheless, EPC has become a convenient means for the Community, as an 
entity, and for member states individually to address issues of common con-
cern.I6 In turn, this mechanism and the positions taken have contributed to a 
sense of community among the members on non-economic matters. I7 
Central to the EPC process is the European Council. The constitutive EPC 
documents created this body; 18 it is the institutionalization of periodic meetings 
of the highest representatives of the governments of the member states. The 
European Council has become an extra-treaty entity through which the leaders 
of the member states oversee the workings of the Community institutions, in 
particular the process of decisionmaking within the Council of the European 
14 For a more detailed explanation of the workings of EPC, see Murphy, supra note 5, at 383-96; 
Stein, supra note 5, at 60-78; and Von der Gablentz, supra note 5, at 688-95 
15 See infra note 16 and accompanying text. 
16 In 1987, for example, the member states reaffirmed their position that rapid withdrawal of Soviet 
forces from Afghanistan was an essential pre-condition for an end to that conflict. See 20 BULL. EUR. 
COMM. (No.3) 80 (1987). The member states called for a political solution which guaranteed the 
Afghan people's right to self-determination.Id. The member states also endorsed the Central American 
peace plan put forth by President Arias of Costa Rica. See 20 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No.6) 102 (1986); 
20 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. II) 87 (1987). In 1986, the member states reaffirmed their condemnation 
of terrorism and agreed to intensify their common effort to combat it. See 19 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 
I) 60 (1986). The member states also issued a common statement on human rights. See 19 BULL. EUR. 
COMM. (No.7) 100 (1986). More recently, in 1989, the Community nations all agreed to simultaneously 
withdraw their envoys from Iran to protest death threats made by the Ayatollah Khomeini against 
Salman Rushdie, author of the novel The Satanic Verses. See Europeans Recall Envoys from Iran over 
Rushdie Case, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1989, at I, col. 6. 
I' Perhaps one reason for the integration that has taken place so far within the Community is that 
emphasis has been placed on economic rather than political issues. See D. LASOK, THE LAW OF THE 
ECONOMY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 385-477 (1980); D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 3, at 5. 
18 Paris Communique, supra note II. See generally Lauwaars, The European Council, 14 COMMON MKT. 
L. REV. 25 (1977). 
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Communities. The European Council is also responsible for providing the 
impetus behind the EPC process. 19 
The heads of state and government meet as the European Council four times 
a year. 20 Also, the foreign ministers of the member states, or their representa-
tives, meet as the Council of the European Communities to consider EEC 
matters. These same ministers can continue their meeting and consider foreign 
affairs matters as the European Council. The President of the Council of the 
European Communities, a position which rotates between the member states 
every six months, is the spokesperson for the European Council in EPC mat-
ters. 21 In this capacity, the President is responsible for responding to questions 
in EPC matters put by the Parliament of the European Communities (Parlia-
ment) and for submitting annual statements to Parliament on EPC matters.22 
The Commission of the European Communities (Commission) participates in 
EPC through its attendance at all ministerial EPC meetings, and it is represented 
at meetings of the Political Committee.23 The Commission has no vote on EPC 
matters. 24 Although formally separate from the Community, EPC is an integral 
part of EEC activity. This is evident from the Commission's participation in the 
EPC process and from the fact that public announcement of EPC results are 
contained in official EEC documents. 25 
III. ORIGINS OF TITLE III AND THE SEA 
Although there is no consensus as to what political European union means, 
the notion of such a union is by no means new. 26 The SEA is only the most 
recent effort at facilitating a European union. During the past several years, 
there have been numerous proposals advancing the concept of a political Eu-
19 See generally COMMITTEE OF THE THREE TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, REPORT ON EUROPEAN INSTI-
TUTIONS 15 (1979) [hereinafter THREE WISE MEN's REPORT]; Duff, The Report of the Three Wise Men, 
19 J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 237, 241-51 (1980-1981); D. LASOK &J. BRIDGE, supra note 3, at 210-14; P. 
MATHIjSEN, supra note 5, at 33-35; Lauwaars, supra note 18, at 25-31; Murphy, supra note 5, at 386-
88; Stein, supra note 5, at 63; Von der Gablentz, supra note 5, at 386-88. 
20 Copenhagen Report, supra note 10, at 15. 
21 Paris Communique, supra note II, at 7. 
22 Luxembourg Report, supra note 8, at 12; Copenhagen Report, supra note 10, at 17; Paris Communique, 
supra note II, at 7. 
23 See generally Murphy, supra note 5, at 391; Stein, supra note 5, at 67-68. 
24 Stein, supra note 5, at 67. 
25 Every issue of the monthly Bulletin of the European Communities contains a section on EPC 
activities, and the annual General Report on the Activities of the European Communities summarizes 
the positions and statements of the member states on EPC matters. 
26 See HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FOURTEENTH REPORT 
ON EUROPEAN UNIFICATION H.L. 226 at x-xii (1985) [hereinafter HOUSE OF LORDS REPORT]; D. LASOK 
& J. BRIDGE, supra note 3, at 27. 
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ropean union. 27 In fact, at one point, the government leaders from the member 
states set European union as a goal to be achieved by the end of the 1970s.28 
The Parliament, especially after the direct election of its members began in 
1979, repeatedly expressed frustration about the slow development of the EEC 
into a political institution.29 In 1981, two member states, Germany and Italy, 
presented a Draft European Act30 which would have empowered the European 
Council to be the controlling political organ within a unified Europe. In re-
sponse, the European Council issued the Solemn Declaration on European 
Union (Solemn Declaration).31 This statement accepted the goal of political 
union, but imposed no obligation on the member states to work toward that 
goal. Moreover, the Solemn Declaration envisioned a union within the frame-
work of the EEC Treaty.32 
Two distinct approaches toward political unification were advocated. One 
approach was to achieve union through the Community; albeit through a Com-
munity with improved and more responsive decisionmaking institutions.33 This 
approach suggested that the European Council assume a more active role in 
coordinating the workings of the EEC institutions and political cooperation. 
The European Council would be the paramount institution within the European 
union. The other approach despaired of political unification through the Com-
munity and advocated unification by agreements and institutions outside the 
EEC.34 
The Solemn Declaration convinced Parliament of the futility of attempting 
to achieve political union through intergovernmental negotiations. 35 Parliament 
proceeded to draft its own unification proposal, the Draft Treaty Establishing 
27 Tindemans Report, 9 BULL. EUR. COMM. (Supp. 10) I (1976); THREE WISE MEN's REPORT, supra note 
19; Draft European Act, reprinted in, DIGEST OF THE INSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE COMMUNITY 
BETWEEN 1950 AND 1982, at 460 (1982) (published by the Committee on Institutional Affairs of the 
European Parliament) [hereinafter Draft European Act]; Draft Treaty Establishing the European 
Union, 27 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 77) 33 (1984) [hereinafter Draft Treaty]; see generally Glaesner, 
supra note I, at 446-48. 
28 See Statement at the Conclusion of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Member States 
of the European Community, reprinted in, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SIXTH GENERAL 
REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1972, at 6 (1973). 
29 See, e.g., 25 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 66) 67-71 (1982); 25 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C ll) 191-93 
(1982). 
30 See Draft European Act, supra note 27. 
31 Solemn Declaration, supra note 13. 
32 See DeZwaan, The Single Europe Act: Conclusion of a Unique Document, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 
747,748 (1986). 
33 See Tindemans Report, supra note 27; THREE WISE MEN'S REPORT, supra note 19; Solemn Declaration, 
supra note 13. 
" See Draft Treaty, supra note 27; Draft European Act, supra note 27. 
35 See F. CAPOTORTI, M. HILF, F. JACOBS & P. JACQUE, THE EUROPEAN UNION TREATY, COMMENTARY 
ON THE DRAFT ADOPTED BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 10 (1986) [hereinafter F. CAPOTORTI]. 
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the European Union (Draft Treaty).36 This Draft Treaty, which Parliament 
adopted in 1984, did not amend the EEC Treaty nor did it contemplate Eu-
ropean union within the framework of the EEC Treaty. Instead, the Draft 
Treaty supplants the EEC Treaty. The Draft Treaty took as its starting point 
the Community patrimony or acquis communautaire. This single, coherent doc-
ument incorporates the institutions of the Community, modifies their roles and 
procedures, and adds certain extra-Community activities such as EPC.37 Not 
surprisingly, the Draft Treaty would have dramatically increased the legislative 
power of Parliament at the expense of the European Council.38 
The Draft Treaty proposed a federalist type of union among the EEC member 
states. It conferred a common citizenship on people of the signatory states and 
provided protection for certain fundamental human rights. For these reasons, 
the Draft Treaty would have impinged on the sovereignty of the member states 
to a greater extent than the EEC Treaty.39 
This bold attempt at unification was clear evidence of Parliament's frustration 
at the pace which the member states were working toward the stated objective 
of European unification. Needless to say, the Draft Treaty was controversia1.40 
Nevertheless, the national legislatures of six member states (there were ten at 
the time) endorsed the Draft Treaty.4! Because of its rather extreme provisions 
and the adoption of the SEA, the Draft Treaty has not been, and probably will 
not be, ratified by the member states. It has had the salutary effect, however, 
of prompting further action by the member states. 
Indeed, the Solemn Declaration preceded the Draft Treaty by about seven 
months. In the Solemn Declaration, the government leaders meeting as the 
European Council pledged to create a united Europe. They acknowledged that 
the "European idea" which had achieved economic integration through the EEC 
was the wish of the European people.42 These statements by the European 
Council were made with the Draft Treaty and the Draft European Act in mind. 
They are certainly an endorsement of a political European union, but they 
demonstrate that the European Council contemplated union through the EEC.43 
The fact that the SEA was drafted and adopted within only two years of 
36 Draft Treaty, supra note 27. 
37 See generally F. CAPOTORTI, supra note 35, at 15-20. 
'8/d. at 88-89; R. BIEBER, J. JACQUE & J. WEILER, AN EVER CLOSER UNION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
OF THE DRAFT TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN UNION 37-40 (1985) [hereinafter EVER CLOSER 
UNION]. 
39 See EVER CLOSER UNION, supra note 38, at 127-41. 
40 See, e.g., EVER CLOSER UNION, supra note 38, at 37-40; HOUSE OF LORDS REPORT, supra note 26. 
41 The national legislatures from Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and West Germany 
endorsed the Draft Treaty. D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 3, at 25. 
42 Solemn Declaration, supra note 13, at preamble. 
43 See DeZwaan, supra note 32, at 747. 
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Parliament's approval of the Draft Treaty is evidence that the member states 
viewed the Draft Treaty seriously. 
The European Council's reaction to the Draft Treaty was the appointment 
of an Ad Hoc Committee for Institutional Affairs (Dooge Committee).44 The 
report of this committee (Dooge Report) suggested improvements in coopera-
tion, both within the EEC and in EPC.45 The Dooge Report did not criticize the 
Draft Treaty. It acknowledged the stagnation that had crept into EEC decision-
making and noted that Europe faced challenges from other nations and from 
relatively high levels of unemployment within the member states. As a means 
of meeting these challenges, the Dooge Report stated that the member states 
must "launch a new venture-establishment of a political entity .... "46 It rec-
ommended the convocation of a conference by the member states to negotiate 
a draft treaty on European union, based on the objectives and methods set out 
in the Report and the Solemn Declaration. In a somewhat surprising endorse-
ment of the Draft Treaty, the Dooge Report urged that the negotiations should 
be "guided by the spirit and method of the Draft Treaty voted by the European 
Parliament."47 Finally, the Report recommended several structural changes to 
the EPC process, most of which were carried over into title III of the Single 
Act. 48 
Events moved very quickly thereafter. The Dooge Committee's final report 
was submitted in March 1985, and the SEA was signed less than a year later in 
February 1986.49 The Luxembourg government became President of the Coun-
cil of the European Communities in July 1985 and proposed amending the 
EEC Treaty as a means of effecting the Dooge Report recommendations. The 
Council of the European Communities accepted the recommendations and 
agreed to call a conference of member state representatives to consider drafting 
amendments to the EEC Treaty. This conference opened in September 1985. 
A working party comprised of representatives to the conference and from 
the Commission was assigned to draft revisions to the EEC Treaty. The Political 
Committee of the European Council was assigned to draft provisions regarding 
EPe. The resulting title III is, in part, a restatement of the EPC mechanisms 
that had been established by prior declarations of the European Council and 
44 REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE FOR INSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 
reprinted in, HOUSE OF LORDS REPORT, supra note 26, at app. 4 [hereinafter DOOGE REPORT]. See also 
Glaesner, supra note I, at 448. 
45 DOOGE REPORT, supra note 44, at app. 4. 
46 I d. at Ixviii. 
47 I d. at Ixxvii. 
48 The Dooge Report also recommended that decisions of the Council of the European Communities 
be by qualified or simple majority and that Parliament be assigned an increased role in the decision-
making process. Both of these reforms are contained to some extent in title II of the SEA. 
49 For an extensive discussion of the history of the drafting of the SEA, see DeZwaan, supra note 
32. 
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had evolved over fifteen years of operation. The working party obtained agree-
ment easily on these points. On other portions of title III, including some of 
its more important provisions, the working party was unable to achieve agree-
ment. 50 
Perhaps it is no surprise, but Parliament's direct role in the drafting of the 
SEA was minimal. It delivered an opinion supporting the calling of the confer-
ence,51 but it was not involved at all in the drafting of the text.52 
IV. EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION AFTER THE SEA 
The resulting document-the SEA-is simply a set of amendments to the 
EEC Treaty and a new set of EPC procedures, both of which contribute to 
European unification. It is not a unification document as is the Draft Treaty. 
Nevertheless, Parliament's objective of increasing its own power and integrating 
EPC into the institutional structure are included in the SEA, although not to 
the extent Parliament would have preferred.53 While Parliament expressed 
reservations on many aspects of the SEA, it did not reject the document, as 
some had feared. 54 
It has been argued that the inclusion of title III within the SEA, a document 
which otherwise simply amends the EEC Treaty, was purely a political compro-
mise. 55 It is true that great care was taken to keep title III separate from the 
rest of the SEA. 56 Title III, however, certainly is not unrelated to the rest of 
the SEA, and its objectives clearly fit into the overall purpose of the SEA. 
Perhaps the first significant point about EPC, as restated in title III, is that 
the system is now embodied in an international agreement. Prior to the SEA, 
the articulation of EPC principles and processes was in declarations and com-
muniques issued after various European Council meetings. While these docu-
ments represented commitments of the member states, they were not legally 
binding agreements. After the enactment of the SEA, these EPC principles now 
have the force of international obligations and, as such, are enforceable as a 
50 See DeZwaan, supra note 32, at 757. 
5! See Resolution, 28 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 229) 29 (1985). 
52 See Bieber, Pantalis & Schoo, supra note 3, at 768. 
53 Id. 
S< Resolution, 29 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 33) 119 (1986); see also DeZwaan, supra note 32, at 761. 
Parliament passed additional resolutions voting to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by 
the SEA even though its preferred version of European union was not achieved. Resolution, 29 OJ. 
EUR. COMM. (No. C 120) 96 (1986). 
55 Glaesner, supra note I, at 453. The name "Single" European Act does not refer so much to the 
idea of a single, unified Europe as it does to one act containing two separate sets of provisions which 
for political purposes are contained in one document. 
56 See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text. 
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matter of international laW.57 A separate issue, however, may remain: whether 
the common actions agreed upon by the European Council through EPC are 
themselves legally enforceable.58 But clearly the EPC process, and the member 
states' obligation to participate in that process, is now a matter of international 
obligation. 
The second significant point, and somewhat related to the first, is the status 
given to the European Council. Article 2 of title I of the SEA provides that the 
"European Council shall bring together the Heads of State or of Government 
of the Member States and the President of the Commission of the European 
Communities."59 By this provision, the existence of the European Council is 
likewise now established by treaty. 
Third, the SEA greatly enhances the status and role of the Commission in 
EPC. The Luxembourg and Copenhagen Reports urged the involvement of the 
Commission in EPC matters, particularly when the issues affected the Com-
munity.60 Title I, however, envisions the Commission as a full partner in EPC 
deliberations and decisionmaking. 
This status of the Commission is carried over into title III. Article 30(3)(a) 
provides that the ministerial meetings constituting the EPC framework are 
meetings of the foreign ministers and a member of the Commission.61 Inclusion 
of the Commission at the ministerial meetings assures full participation in EPC. 
This point is reinforced in the next section, article 30(3)(b), which states that 
the "Commission shall be fully associated with the proceedings of Political 
Cooperation."62 The Commission is also charged with maintaining the consis-
tency between policies agreed on in EPC and the external policies of the EEC. 
The President of the Council of the Communities, in his capacity as Presidency 
57 See Freestone & Davidson, Community Competence and Part III of the Single European Act, 23 COMM. 
MKT. L. REV. 793, 796 (1986). As to the legal status of title III within the legal system of the European 
Communities, see infra notes 99-102, 107-09 and accompanying text. 
58 In 1982, for example, the dispute between the United Kingdom and Argentina regarding the 
Falkland Islands was extensively considered within the Community and EPC. As an EPC matter, the 
member states agreed to prohibit the export of arms and military equipment to Argentina. See 
Community Solidarity in the Faulkland Islands Conflict, 15 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No.4) 7-8 (1982). The SEA 
does not speak to the issue of whether member states refusing to abide by a similar measure would 
now be in breach of an international obligation. 
59 SEA, supra note I, at title I, art. 2. 
60 Luxembourg Report, supra note 8, at 12; Copenhagen Report, supra note 10, at 18. The President and 
members of the Commission were permitted to attend EPC meetings, and the Deputy Secretary 
General represented the Commission at meetings of the Political Committee. See Stein, supra note 5, 
at 67-68. 
61 SEA, supra note I, at title III, art. 30(3)(a); Edward, supra note 3, at 29. 
62 SEA, supra note I, at title III, art. 30(3)(b). Presumably, the Commission's full association carries 
with it a vote on EPC matters. Under the earlier EPC system, the Commission did not have this right. 
Stein, supra note 5, at 67. 
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of EPC, and the Commission are jointly charged with maintaining this consis-
tency.63 
Structurally, the SEA provides that EPC is to be conducted, for the most part, 
as it has in the past. Title I, article 3(2) provides that the provisions of title III 
confirm and supplement the procedures agreed to by the Luxembourg, Copen-
hagen, and London Reports; the Solemn Declaration; and the practices grad-
ually established by the members. Article 3(2) states that the institutions and 
bodies responsible for EPC shall exercise their powers and jurisdiction under 
the terms of title III and the documents referred to in title I, article 1. These 
provisions incorporate the mentioned documents by reference and may elevate 
them to the status of international agreements. 
Although the status of the European Council is elevated in title III, its role 
is left entirely unstated. Both the proposals for intra-Community and extra-
Community unification called for significant involvement of the European 
Council as a supervisory and coordinating body.64 Under the SEA, however, the 
European Council is assigned no role. It is merely to meet as such twice a year.65 
Even this is a reduction from the four meetings a year called for in the Paris 
Communique. This reduction reflects the concern that member states not view 
the European Council as simply another Community institution dealing with 
day-to-day business. Instead, the European Council should playa strategic role 
and give direction and political impetus to the Community.66 The foreign min-
isters, or their representatives, however, are to meet at least four times a year, 
and they may meet to discuss foreign policy matters during meetings of the 
Council of the European Communities.67 
The remaining structural provisions for EPC are contained in title III. The 
President of the Council of the European Communities shall also be the "Pres-
idency of European Political Cooperation."68 The role of the Presidency remains 
largely unchanged. The role of the Presidency is to initiate action, coordinate 
the EPC process, and represent the member states regarding EPC in relations 
with non-Community countries.69 The Presidency is responsible for managing 
political cooperation and organizing the periodic meetings.70 Title III creates a 
Political Committee comprised of the political directors from the foreign min-
63 SEA. supra note 1, at title III, art. 30(5). 
64 See supra note 33-38 and accompanying text. 
65 SEA, supra note 1, at title I, art. 2. 
66 DOOGE REPORT, supra note 44, at lxxv; Ever Closer Union, supra note 38, at 337; Solemn Declaration, 
supra note 13, at 25-26; see also D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 3, at 213. 
67 SEA, supra note 1, at title I, art. 3(a). 
68 !d. at title III, art. 30(10)(a). 
69 !d. at title III, art. 30(lO)(b). The Presidency is also the spokesperson for EPC generally. 
70 [d. 
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istries of the member states and requires that the Committee meet regularly.71 
The Political Committee's function remains essentially unchanged: to prepare 
for the ministerial meetings and to maintain ongoing business of EPC.72 Further, 
title III creates a group of European Correspondents, under the direction of 
the Political Committee, to monitor the implementation of EPC policies.73 Title 
III also authorizes working groups to work under the direction of the Political 
Committee and on tasks specifically assigned to it.74 
A significant structural change is the creation of a permanent secretariat 
based in Brussels to assist the Presidency in EPC activities.75 The lack of per-
manent staff for EPC had long been a source of concern.76 Previously, the 
system of EPC relied primarily on the foreign office of the member state serving 
as President of the Council of the European Communities. This was a hardship 
especially for the smaller countries.77 
Although title II of the SEA significantly enhances the role of Parliament in 
the EEC's legislative process, its involvement in EPC has not been increased. In 
title III, the signatories commit to ensuring that Parliament be "closely associated 
with ... [EPC]."78 This provision strengthens Parliament's role in the EPC 
process to the extent that title III is legally binding.79 The specifics of the 
consultation procedures in title III, however, may result in an actual diminution 
of Parliament's role. 
Article 30(4) oftitle III requires the Presidency to regularly inform Parliament 
of the foreign policy issues examined in EPC and to insure that its views are 
taken into consideration. Title III, however, does not specify the means by 
which such consultation is to take place. Under the previous procedures, the 
Luxembourg and Copenhagen Reports specifically called for periodic meetings 
between the foreign ministers and the Political Committee of Parliament. At 
the meetings, the parties discussed policy matters and received Parliament's 
proposals as a means of involving Parliament in the process.80 The Copenhagen 
Report also required the Presidency to submit a report annually to Parliament 
71 The Luxembourg and Copenhagen Reports required meetings at least quarterly. In fact, the 
Committee members meet much more frequently, at least monthly. See Stein, supra note 5, at 64. 
72 SEA, supra note I, at title III, art. 30(IO)(c). 
"Id. at title III, art. 30(10)(e). 
74Id. at title III, art. 30(1O)(f). 
75Id. at title III, art. 30(IO)(g). 
76 See, e.g., A Report on European Political Cooperation and the Role of the European Parliament, 1981-
1982 EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 1-335) 48-52 (1981) [hereinafter Report on European Political Cooperation). 
77 See Murphy, supra note 5, at 390. 
78 SEA, supra note I, at title III, art. 30(4). 
79 See Bieber, Pantalis & Schoo, supra note 3, at 786-87. How Parliament can enforce this right, 
however, is unclear. See infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text. 
80 The Luxembourg Report called for these meetings two times a year. Luxembourg Report, supra note 
8, at 12. The Copenhagen Reports increased the number to four a year. Copenhagen Report, supra note 
10, at 17. See Lauwaars, supra note 18, at 30. 
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on political cooperation.8! Parliament debated this annual report and the Pres-
idency was to reply to the debate.82 In addition, the Presidency was to submit 
to questioning by Parliament on EPC.83 
Article 1 of title I provides that political cooperation shall be governed by 
title III. The provisions of title III are said to "confirm and supplement the 
procedures agreed to in the reports of Luxembourg, ... Copenhagen, ... 
London, ... and the Solemn Declaration."84 Using this incorporation technique, 
the periodic meetings and the annual report of the Presidency called for in the 
Luxembourg and Copenhagen Reports can ensure that the views of the Parlia-
ment be taken into consideration, as title III requires. Parliament's questioning 
of the Presidency can also serve a useful oversight role.85 It is unclear, however, 
whether this procedure is required any longer. It is not expressly provided for 
in title III. Curiously, the Paris Communique, which did call for it, is not one 
of the documents referred to in title I as being the basis of EPC. 
V. THE IMPACT OF THE SEA ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION 
The working procedures of title III continue the EPC mechanism whereby a 
common foreign policy can be pursued. The provisions of title III, however, 
do more than restate past EPC procedures. 
A. Commitment to a Common European Foreign Policy 
The first subsection of article 30 contains a broad commitment by the signa-
tories to use the EPC procedures for foreign affairs issues. It states that the 
parties "being members of the European Community, shall endeavor to jointly 
formulate and implement a European foreign policy."86 One might dismiss this 
provision as noncommittal-as being merely an agreement to attempt a joint 
European foreign policy. The sections of article 30 which follow demonstrate 
that this is not just hortatory rhetoric. Through these sections, the signatories 
more specifically obligate themselves to arrive at common policies. 
There is, moreover, an interesting implication of the broad, somewhat ephem-
eral commitment in article 30(1). It is a more affirmative commitment to a 
common foreign policy than was expressed previously in the EPC documents 
listed in article 1, and it shows an evolution in the EPC process. The Luxem-
bourg and Copenhagen Reports seem to be premised on the notion of consistent 
81 Copenhagen Report, supra note 10, at 17. 
82 Report on European Political Cooperation, supra note 76, at 43. 
83 Paris Communique, supra note II, at 7. 
84 SEA, supra note I, at title I, art. 1. 
85 See Murphy, supra note 5, at 393-94; Stein, supra note 5, at 68-69. 
86 SEA, supra note I, title III, art. 30(1). 
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national foreign policy positions which fostered a political union. 87 Article 30(1) 
takes this point further; it commits the signatories to attempt a common Eu-
ropean foreign policy. 
Articles 30(2)(a) and (b) of title III require consultation and coordination on 
the same basis as the Luxembourg and Copenhagen Reports. The signatories 
agree in these sections to inform and consult with each other on foreign policy 
matters of general interest before deciding on final positions. Articles 30(2)(c) 
and (d), however, take these consultation procedures further. Before adopting 
final positions, the signatories must take into account the position of the other 
signatories and the desirability of adopting a common policy.sS The signatories, 
moreover, must agree to avoid taking positions which weaken the efficacy of 
the European unit-the Community-in international affairs or within inter-
national organizations.s9 Hence, the signatories agree positively to attempt a 
common policy and agree negatively to avoid any unilateral policies which might 
diminish the standing of the Community. The signatories carryover these same 
commitments to their activities as members of international organizations or 
participants in international conferences. In each they agree to take common 
positions on issues germane to EPC.90 
While these provisions do not require the signatories to reach common po-
sitions, they do require some affirmative action to attempt common actions. 
The obligation to attempt common action is implicit in the language "shall 
endeavor," which is repeated throughout the SEA. Also, article 30(3)(c) requires 
the signatories to take specific actions to reach the goal of common action. 
Article 30(3)(c) goes further than the prior EPC documents by providing that, 
in order to "ensure swift adoption of common positions and the implementation 
of joint action, the High Contracting Parties shall, as far as possible, refrain from 
impeding the formulation of a consensus and the joint actions this could produce."9[ 
This obligation is designed as a fairly strong-armed technique for consensus 
building. It requires the signatories to yield their different national positions in 
favor of consensus, "as far as possible." One might quickly focus on the quali-
fying phrase "as far as possible" and conclude that this provision really adds 
nothing and imposes no additional obligation on the signatories. If the member 
87 The Luxembourg Report urges a coordination of positions, and common action when possible 
and desirable. Luxembourg Report, supra note 8, at II. The Copenhagen Report requires the signatories 
to consult on foreign policy matters and not to take final positions until such consultation. Copenhagen 
Report, supra note 10, at 17-18. In the Paris Communique, the Heads of State and Government 
committed themselves to gradually adopting common positions and to coordinate their diplomatic 
activities in matters affecting the interests of the European Communities. Paris Communique, supra note 
II, at 7. 
88 SEA, supra note I, at title III, art. 30(2)(c). 
89 [d. at title III, art. 30(2)(d). 
90 !d. at title III, arts. 30(7)(a), (7)(b). 
91 !d. at title III, art. 30(3)(c). 
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states are of the same mind, then there is consensus; if not, presumably it is for 
some serious internal reason, and hence consensus is neither possible nor re-
quired. This reading, however, seems to be too perfunctory. 
Article 30(3)(c) presumes consensus and common action. Any member state 
failing to accede to the majority bears the burden of demonstrating, if chal-
lenged, that its failure to yield is not possible. Hence, the "as far as possible" 
exception seems to be precisely that, a narrow exception from consensus for 
circumstances out of the ordinary. The formulation of this obligation in article 
30(3)(c) implies that blocking consensus is not presumed to be the usual state 
of behavior. In article 30(3)(c), the signatories appear to add substance, rather 
than mere rhetoric, to the goal of a common European foreign policy.92 
B. Separation of EPC and the Community 
The SEA carefully separated the Community, on the one hand, and EPC, on 
the other. This separation is clear in at least three respects within the SEA. It 
92 It is interesting to consider article 30(3)(c) in relation to the amendments to the EEC Treaty in 
title II which allow for voting by qualified majority. /d. at title II, arts. 6, 7. This reform was intended 
to dilute the effect of consensus voting under the so-called Luxembourg Accords and to eliminate the 
stagnation in Community affairs which resulted from it. See HOUSE OF LORDS REPORT, supra note 26, 
at xvii-xx; D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 3, at 205-lO; P. MATHljSEN, supra note 5, at 30-32. In 
contrast, article 30(c)(30) encourages consensus building. 
From the outset, the EEC Treaty has provided for qualified majority voting by the Council on most 
measures. In the mid-1960's, a crisis occurred which had the effect of paralyzing the Council as a 
decision making body. Relations between France and the other five member states became strained. 
In 1965, during the Council Presidency of France, certain measures vital to the Community were not 
adopted because of France's opposition and its control of the timetable for adoption. For seven months 
thereafter France refused to participate in Council activities. This stalemate was broken at an informal 
Council meeting in Luxembourg. The understanding reached there was that when voting by qualified 
majority was allowed and the matter affected very important interests of the members, the Council 
would endeavor to reach a unanimously acceptable solution. France maintained that discussion on the 
topic must continue until unanimity was reached. See Luxembourg Accords printed in COMMISSION OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, NINTH GENERAL REpORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITIES 
31-33 (1966); HOUSE OF LORDS REPORT, supra note 26, at xix; D. LASOK &J. BRIDGE, supra note 3, at 
205-06. This understanding did not constitute an amendment to the EEC Treaty and is thought to 
be legally invalid. See D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 3, at 207. As a consequence of these Accords, 
the Council did not resolve many important matters. 
In 1974, the Heads of State and Government announced that is necessary to renounce the practice 
of requiring unanimity for all decisions. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EIGHTH 
GENERAL REpORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1974, at 298 (1975). The re-
formed voting provisions in title II reinforce the notion that qualified majority, not unanimous, voting 
is encouraged. These provisions of title II amend the voting procedures to reduce from unanimity to 
qualified majority the votes necessary for approval of certain measures. S." D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, 
supra note 3, at 209. 
On the other hand, the aim of article 30(c)(3) is to force consensus. If consensus is achieved, common 
action can be taken. The paralysis of the Council resulting from the Luxembourg Accords was the 
result of a lack of consensus. 
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is also clear that the separation is more formal than real and that functionally 
there is little separation. 
First, article 3 of title I sets out separate bases for the authority and jurisdiction 
of the Community institutions and for EPC. Article 3(1) states that the EEC 
institutions exercise their powers and jurisdiction under the EEC Treaty as 
amended by title II of the SEA. Article 3(2) states that the institutions and 
bodies responsible for EPC exercise their power and jurisdiction according to 
title III and the documents referred to in article l,93 Thus, article 3(1) purports 
to confine the conduct and activities of Community institutions to those set forth 
in the EEC Treaty while article 3(2) lists the documents governing EPC. Article 
3(1) does not, however, remove EPC from the Community. 
Second, the signatories in titles I, II, and IV are referred to as member states. 
This is consistent with the notion that these titles amend the EEC Treaty. In 
contrast, throughout title III the signatories are referred to as "High Contract-
ing Parties."94 This distinction highlights the separation of EPC from the Com-
munity order. 
Article 3(2) and article 30, however, do not divorce EPC from the Community. 
Within title III, the signatories, as independent contracting parties, acknowledge 
their relationship to the Community. Article 30(1) refers to the "High Contract-
ing Parties, being members of the European Community .... "95 The reference 
to High Contracting Parties is typical in treaties and reinforces the concept that 
the agreements regarding EPC in title III constitute international commitments. 
It may also be construed as a statement that these commitments are separate 
from the Community order.96 Within article 30(1), however, the signatories 
acknowledge their relationship to the Community. They refer to themselves as 
"members of the European Community."97 More importantly, the signatories 
make the commitments of title III as such.98 
93 SEA, supra note I, at title I, art. 3(2). 
94 See id. at title III, art. 30. One exception is in Article 30(IO)(b) in which the Presidency is charged 
with the responsibility of initiating action and "coordinating and representing the positions of the 
Member States in relations with third countries." Id. at title III, art. 30(10)(b) (emphasis added). Former 
European Court Judge Pierre Pescatore is critical, among other things, of the draftsmanship of the 
SEA. Judge Pescatore refers to it as "the worst piece of drafting I have come across in my practice of 
European Affairs .... " Pescatore, supra note I, at 15. Judge Pescatore is especially critical of the 
drafting because it in large part amends the EEC Treaty which he regards as being very precisely 
drafted. Id. 
95 SEA, supra note I, at title III, art. 30(1). 
96 The negotiations leading up to the SEA and the drafting of the several titles shows this separateness 
as well. The intergovernmental conference drafted titles I, II, and IV. The Political Committee of the 
European Council drafted title III. See DeZwaan, supra note 32, at 747-60. 
97 SEA, supra note I, at title III, art. 30(1). 
98Id. Article 30(1) reads in its entirety: "The High Contracting Parties, being members of the 
European Communities, shall endeavor jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy." 
/d. 
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Third, title IV, article 31 contains perhaps the most significant effort to 
separate EPC from the Community. This article states that the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities (European Court) shall 
apply only to title II, the title amending the EEC Treaty, and to article 32.99 
This provision purports to separate EPC and title III from the Community 
legal order. 100 Consequently, although title III sets forth a series of international 
obligations, these obligations and procedures are not incorporated into or en-
forceable within the Community legal order. Likewise, the European Council, 
which article 3 of title I establishes as a legal personality, is not incorporated 
into the Community legal order. 
Title III, however, is replete with language creating obligations. Most of its 
provisions state that the High Contracting Parties "shall" do certain things. 101 
If these obligations are not enforceable within the Community legal order, the 
signatories have recourse to other fora of international dispute resolution. 102 
C. Role of the Commission in EPC 
The purported bright line between the European Communities, on the one 
hand, and EPC, on the other, places the Commission in an ambiguous position. 
In turn, this ambiguity undercuts the separation of EPC from the Communities. 
The Commission is purely a Community institution. In contrast, the European 
Council, although consisting of the same members as the Council of the Euro-
pean Community, is at least formally separate from the Community.l03 Under 
title I, article 2 and title III (neither of which are subject to the jurisdiction of 
the European Court) the Commission is assigned a significant role in EPC. The 
Commission is a full member of the European Council (article 2(1» and partic-
ipates in the EPC process (article 30(3)(b». Also, the Commission is required 
along with the Presidency of EPC to assure that the external policies of the 
99Id. at title III, art. 32. Article 32 provides that, subject to article 3(1) (title II) and article 31, 
nothing in the SEA affects the treaties establishing the European Communities or other treaties 
modifying or supplementing them. Id. 
100 See Glaesner, supra note I, at 451; Freestone & Davidson, supra note 57, at 796. 
101 For example, article 30(1) provides that the parties "shall endeavor jointly to formulate and 
implement a European foreign policy." SEA, supra note I, at art. 30(1). Article 30(3)(c) states that the 
parties "shall, as far as possible, refrain from ... impeding the formation of a consensus and joint 
action .... " Id. at 'art. 30(3)(c). Article 30(8) provides that the parties "shall organize" a dialogue with 
third countries. Id. at art. 30(8). 
102 Freestone & Davidson, supra note 57, at 797. The authors suggest that title III might also be 
enforceable in the national courts of those signatories which accept treaties as directly part of their 
national legal systems, such as Germany. It is not clear how other signatories would have standing to 
raise title III issues in those national systems or what rights title III confers on citizens which could 
be raised in those courts. 
103 See Murphy, supra note 5, at 390. 
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Community and EPC are consistent. 104 By these provisions, the signatories have 
expanded the role and authority of the Commission, and they have assigned 
the Commission certain additional responsibilities within the EPC process. This 
institution, which before had been purely a creature of the EEC Treaty, is now 
assigned extra-Community activities. lOS By virtue of article 31, however, the 
Commission's EPC activities apparently are not reviewable by the European 
Court. 
What, if any, review of the Commission's role in EPC exists is unclear. Al-
though, by reason of article 31, title III is not incorporated into Community 
law, it does contain a series of international obligations. The Commission, how-
ever, is neither an international person,I06 nor is it a signatory of the SEA. 
Consequently, it is difficult to see how the obligations of title III can be enforced 
against a recalcitrant Commission. 107 
The corollary legal issues regarding the Commission's involvement in EPC 
are similarly difficult. Title I and title III require action on the part of the 
Commission. Assume a member state or other Community institution believes 
a particular action by the Commission, or participation of the Commission as a 
general matter, is outside its authority. The basis for judicial review of such 
conduct is difficult to articulate. The SEA appears to give the Commission an 
extra-treaty role. The rules of the EEC Treaty are not applicable to review the 
Commission's discharge of these responsibilities. 
Certainly, if in performing its obligations under title III, the Commission 
were to violate some provision of the EEC Treaty or other Community law, the 
European Court could review the Commission's action and find it prohibited 
by Treaty authority. lOB There is no provision in the EEC Treaty, however, stating 
that the Commission is limited to the authority granted to it by the EEC 
Treaty.109 Consequently, it may be possible for the Commission to perform its 
104 SEA, supra note 1, art. 30(5). Article 30(5) obligates the Presidency of EPC and the Commission 
to assure consistency between the external policies of the Community and EPC. 1 t requires each to 
discharge this obligation "within its own sphere of competence." [d. Article 30(3)(b), however, which 
inserts the Commission into the EPC process, is not so limited. 
10' See supra notes 59-63, 105 and accompanying text 
106 While the Community itself enjoys a type of international personality, its institutions do not. 
Algera v. Common Assembly, 1956-57 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 39; D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 3, 
at 34. 
107 Under article 30(4), the Presidency is also required to inform regularly the Parliament of the 
issues being examined within the EPC and to insure that Parliament's views are taken into consider-
ation. But it is unclear how the European Parliament, which similarly is not an international person 
or signatory, can enforce its right to participate in the EPC process. 
108 See generally T. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, 335-37 (2d. ed. 
1988). 
109 Article 4(1) of the EEC Treaty lists the institutions of the Community, including the Commission, 
and states that "[e]ach institution shall act within the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty." EEC 
Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 4(1). 
This provision can be read in several ways. By one reading, it means that each institution when 
discharging Community or Treaty activities shall act according to the EEC Treaty. This reading does 
1989] FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 353 
title III role in a manner which is consistent with, or at least not in violation of, 
its Community authority. Given the uncertainty of judicial review, the private 
and perhaps public persuasion of the Council of the European Communities, 
the European Council, or Parliament may be required either to force partici-
pation or to review excessive participation. 
The question of the Community's foreign relations power is a very sensitive 
one. In Commission v. Council (ERTA Case),IID the European Court took the 
position that the Community has the power to enter into international agree-
ments and otherwise to engage in foreign relations over issues covered by part 
I of the EEC Treaty. The member states have been concerned that this decision 
allows the Community to aggregate power to itself at their expense. 111 One 
reason for not incorporating title III into the Community legal order is that 
same fear. To do so would give the Community-biased European Court the 
opportunity to further extend the authority of the Community in foreign af-
fairs.ll2 The lack of Community review of the Commission's activity within title 
III, however, appears to allow for precisely that activism. 
At one perhaps crucial point, title III does confine the Commission's role in 
EPC. Article 30(5) charges the Presidency and the Commission, "each within its 
own sphere of competence,"113 with maintaining consistency between the exter-
nal policies of EPC and the Community. To the extent that the Commission 
discharges this function, the Commission's authority seems to be limited by its 
authority granted under the EEC Treaty. To avoid the uncertainties surround-
ing judicial review of the Commission's role in EPC, there might be a tendency 
to consider all of the Commission's EPC activities as subsumed under this 
section. The Commission's general participation in the EPC process, however, 
is not limited by the language "within its competency." Further, the SEA appears 
not negate the possibility of extra-Treaty responsibilities being assigned to a Community institution. 
The provision can also be read to mean that every activity of the institution must be discharged 
according to the EEC Treaty. 
The signatories of the SEA certainly were not guided by this latter reading. They assigned the 
Commission responsibilities and activities not mentioned in the EEC Treaty, and then they explicitly 
stated in article 31 of the SEA that these activities are outside the Community legal order. The latter 
reading of article 4(1) would preclude any Commission participation in the EPC process, since EPC is 
specifically outside the EEC Treaty. This is clearly not what the signatories intended. 
The Court of Justice of the European Community (European Court) has interpreted the powers of 
Community institutions rather inclusively when discharging Community-related activities. The Euro-
pean Court has not limited the authority of the institutions to that which is explicitly stated in the 
EEC Treaty. See, e.g., Casagrande v. Landes-haupstadt Munchen, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 773, 14 
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 423 (1974); Commission v. Council (ERTA Case), 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 263, 
10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 335 (1971) [hereinafter ERTA Case]. There are no Court cases as yet reviewing 
the Commission's authority to engage in activities outside the Community order. 
110 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 263, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 335 (1971). 
III See Freestone & Davidson, supra note 57, at 799. 
112 [d. 
II' SEA, supra note I, at title III, art. 30(5). 
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to assign the Commission a much broader role than simply maintaining consis-
tency of external positions. 
D. Functional Realities of the New EPC 
The role assigned to the Commission by title III, as well as the continuation 
of past EPC practices, assures not only more interchange within the Commu-
nity's institutions on EPC matters, but also significant involvement by the Com-
munity directly in the EPC decisions. Given this reality, it is difficult to maintain 
that the Community and the EPC process are separate. The signatories have 
acknowledged their desire for a political European union, and the Community 
and EPC both have as an object "to contribute together to making concrete 
progress towards European unity .... "114 Why then have the signatories gone 
to the extreme lengths referred to assure, at least on paper, that the two are 
separate? Why not subsume EPC within the Community as has been previously 
suggested? 115 
The formal separation of the Community and EPC provides the member 
states with several advantages. As a practical matter, the Community is deeply 
involved in EPC. Yet the formal separation of the two gives the member states 
the opportunity to deny the degree of unity which exists. A European foreign 
policy directed by the Community would diminish the status and autonomy of 
the member states. There may be a fear that the Community would become 
too effective. To increase the sphere of Community competence and include 
foreign affairs unrelated to the other Community activities could force a political 
European union, or a more complete union, before the signatories are ready.116 
A second advantage of the formal separation is that EPC, including the 
Commission's involvement, is outside the European Court and the qualified 
voting provisions of the EEC Treaty. This may make it easier for the member 
states to handle contentious issues, especially if it is unclear whether they directly 
relate to Community activities. If these difficult foreign policy issues are handled 
114 SEA, supra note I, at title I, art. I. See also Solemn Declaration, supra note 13, at 25-26. 
115 See, e.g., Draft Treaty, supra note 27. 
116 The unification consequences of many of the measures contemplated in the SEA are already 
causing alarm within the Community. For example, the United Kingdom has expressed concern over 
the notion of a single European currency and central bank. See Single European Currency 'Long Way 
Off, The Times (London), July I, 1988, at 12, col. 4; EEC Rules Give Britain the Right to Veto Plan for 
European Central Bank, The Times (London), July 2, 1988, at 7, col. 5, 10 col. I. The United Kingdom 
has also reacted to a statement by the President of the Commission, M. Jacques Delors, that national 
parliaments will have to give way to the embryo of a European government within seven years and to 
the reality of the single European market after 1992. See Parliament 'Doomed' by European Government, 
The Times (London), July 7, 1988, at I, col. 2; European Approaches, The Times (London), July II, 
1988, at 15, col. I (editorial). 
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within EPC, there is little risk that the EPC action will later be judged to be 
beyond Community competence. ll7 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The EPC process as discussed in this article has only recently been imple-
mented. It is too early to know whether the process will work more efficiently 
or differently than it did in the pre-SEA era. More importantly, perhaps, it is 
too early to know whether the process will really contribute to the political 
unification of Europe. The willingness of the member states to embody EPC in 
a treaty and assign the Commission such an integral role in EPC, however, 
attests to the potential the member states believe EPC possesses. 
117 See Freestone & Davidson, supra note 57, at 800. 
